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Abstract—Swarm robotics systems are becoming an important
component of both academic research and real-world applica-
tions. However, in order to reach widespread adoption, new
models that ensure the secure cooperation of these systems need
to be developed. This work proposes a novel model to encapsulate
cooperative robotic missions in Merkle trees. With the proposed
model, swarm operators can provide the “blueprint” of the
swarm’s mission without disclosing its raw data. In other words,
data verification can be separated from data itself. We propose a
system where robots in the swarm have to “prove” their integrity
to their peers by exchanging cryptographic proofs. This work
analyzes and tests the proposed approach for two different robotic
missions: foraging (where robots modify the environment) and
maze formation (where robots become part of the environment).
In both missions, robots were able to cooperate and carry out
sequential operations in the correct order without having explicit
knowledge about the mission’s high-level goals or objectives. The
performance, communication costs, and information diversity
requirements for the proposed approach are analyzed. Finally,
conclusions are drawn and future work directions are suggested.
Keywords–Distributed Robotics; Cooperative Robotics; Data
Privacy; Research Challenges; Merkle Trees; Verifiable Robotics;
Trustable Robotics; Reliable Robotics
I. INTRODUCTION
Swarm robotics systems [1] have the potential to revolu-
tionize many industries, from targeted material delivery [2] to
precision farming [3], [4]. Boosted by technical breakthroughs,
such as cloud computing [5], [6], novel hardware design [7],
[8], [9], and manufacturing techniques [10], swarms of robots
are envisioned to play an important role in both industrial [11]
and urban [12], [13] activities. The emergence of robot swarms
has been acknowledged as one of the ten robotics grand
challenges for the next 5-10 years that will have significant
socioeconomic impact [14]. However, despite having such a
promising future, many important aspects which need to be
considered in realistic deployments are either underexplored
or neglected [14].
One of the main reasons why swarms of robots have not
been widely adopted in real-world applications is because there
is no consensus on how to design swarm robotics systems that
include perception, action, and communication among large
groups of robots [14]. In addition, recent research points out
that the lack of security standards in the field is also hindering
the adoption of this technology in data-sensitive areas (e.g.,
military, surveillance, monitoring) [15]. These research gaps
are motivating scientists to focus on new fields of study such
as applied swarm security [16], [17] and privacy [18], [19] as
well as to revisit already accepted assumptions in the field.
*Corresponding author: Eduardo Castello´ Ferrer, ecstll@mit.edu
From the origins of swarm robotics research, robot swarms
were assumed to be fault-tolerant by design, due to the large
number of robot units involved [20], [21], [22], [23]. However,
it has been shown that a small number of partially failed robots
(with defective sensors, broken actuators, noisy communica-
tions devices, etc.) can have a significant impact on the overall
system reliability and performance [24]. The first surveys on
swarm robotics security were presented in [25], [26]. These
works identified physical capture and tampering with members
as significant threats to robot swarms. Physical capture of a
robot might not only lead to loss of availability but also to the
capture of security credentials or critical details of the swarm
operation [27]. For instance, if a robot is tampered with and
reintroduced into the swarm, an attacker might influence the
behaviour of the whole system [23] and eventually hinder the
entire operation [28]. These attacks would be unique to swarm
robotics technology and are particularly critical in situations
where robot swarms must share data among individual robot
units or with human operators.
In previous swarm robotics work, researchers hard-coded
the complete set of rules that trigger the transitions from task to
task [22], [29], [30] in all the robots within a mission. Although
this distributed approach is more robust and fault-tolerant than
centralized methods, it significantly increases the attack surface
(i.e., total sum of vulnerabilities) for an attacker to figure out
the swarm’s high-level goals and modify the system’s behavior
[27]. Due to these concerns, in this work, we aim to shed light
on the following questions: How can we make sure that robot
swarms can cooperate while minimizing security risks such as
physical capture or tampered members? Is there a way to pro-
vide the “blueprint” of a robotic mission without describing the
mission itself? In other words, is it possible that robot swarms
fulfill step-by-step (i.e., sequential) missions without having
explicit knowledge about the mission’s objectives? To answer
these questions, we propose a model which allows robots to
cooperate without exposing the high-level information about
the swarm’s goals. To do so, we explore for the first time the
idea of encapsulating robotic missions into Merkle trees. More
specifically, we introduce a framework where data verification
is separated from data itself. By exchanging cryptographic
“proofs” within the swarm, robots are able to “prove” to their
peers that they know specific pieces of information included
in the swarm’s mission and therefore cooperate towards its
completion.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section II summarizes related work on Merkle trees and their
applications outside the robotics field. Section II-A provides
a formalization of Merkle trees and introduces the concept of
“proof”. Section III describes the setup of our experiments
including the type of mission, robots, simulator and analysis
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
09
26
6v
2 
 [c
s.R
O]
  7
 Ju
l 2
01
9
metrics used to evaluate the proposed approach. Section IV
presents the results of our experiments. Section V discusses
the results obtained and proposes future directions where our
approach also shows promising results. Finally, Section VI
provides our conclusions.
II. MERKLE TREES
A Merkle Tree (MT) [31] is a hash-based tree structure
where data is not stored in the interior nodes but in the leaves.
MTs belong to the family of Authenticated Data Structures
(ADS), a type of data objects whose operations can be carried
out by an untrusted third party. Two main roles, provers (P)
and verifiers (V), are involved when using MTs. Provers store
the data of interest encapsulated in an MT and are able to
answer queries about it. Verifiers send queries to provers and
in exchange they receive a “proof”. A proof is a piece of
information by which one party (P) can demonstrate to another
party (V) that they know a value, without conveying any
information apart from the fact that they know that specific
value. Verifiers can check whether any piece of information
belongs to the MT by checking the validity of the proof
received. Fig. 1 shows a general description of this process.
MTs have two main properties: correctness and security. On
the one hand, correctness implies that a proof can be easily
generated to verify and demonstrate that a piece of information
is known and correct. This can be done without exposing the
raw information itself by using cryptographic hashes. On the
other hand, security implies that a computationally bounded,
malicious agent cannot forge an incorrect result and therefore
only agents that know the appropriate information can generate
valid proofs.
In previous literature, MTs have been used in a wide va-
riety of applications ranging from efficient data authentication
[32], sharing [33] and integrity [34], to validation in large
datasets, sensor networks [35], [36], software updates [37],
etc. However, to the best of our knowledge, no research work
has focused on the use of MTs in the field of robotics. In this
work, we propose a model by which high-level missions can
be encapsulated within an MT as a set of atomic operations
performed by a swarm of robots. By searching the environ-
ment, robots are able to obtain sensor information and check
whether potential actions are included in the MT (or not). In
Figure 1. Workflow between provers (P) and verifiers (V). (1) V sends a
query (Q) to P regarding a particular node (e.g., node 0). (2) P sends a proof
pi (chain of hashes) that demonstrates knowledge about the requested node.
(3) V verifies the proof by computing in a bottom-up fashion the received
information. The proof is regarded as valid if V can generate the root node it
kept in memory by using pi.
the affirmative case, robots are able to use MT proofs to prove
to their peers that certain parts of the mission were discovered,
carried out, and completed.
A. Merkle tree proofs
An MT of depth d is a tree with n = 2d−1 leaf nodes:
x0, . . . , xn−1, where each leaf node encapsulates a hash string
of an associated operation, while each interior node contains
the hash of the combination of its two children. A depiction of
a complete MT for d = 3 is given in Fig. 2(a). Each leaf node
(green blocks) encapsulates the combined hash of two hashes:
hs (sensor’s input) and ha (robot’s action). These two hashes
describe an atomic operation within the swarm’s high-level
mission. For instance, the hash of the action “carry to target”
(ha) and the hash of the sensor input “red token” (hs) would
be included in one of the leaf nodes by using the hashing
function H: Hxi = H(ha, hs). As outlined in Fig. 1, when
V queries P it retrieves the value xi at index i ∈ [0, n − 1].
Then, P returns the value xi together with a chain of digests pi
needed to compute the root node digest (red block). V keeps
(at least) a copy of the root node hash itself, and checks pi by
trying to recompute the root node hash in a bottom-up manner.
Fig. 2(b) shows the proof pi for a fetch at the leaf position
x1. It consists of four elements in sequence, the two hashes ha
and hs, the hash H4, and the hash H3. Then, the verification
proceeds bottom up: V computes the hash of the two hashes hs
and ha, which is H5, and concatenates it with the hash of H4
provided in pi. Next, it concatenates H4 and H5 and computes
the hash of what should be the digest for node H2. Then, it
concatenates H3 provided in pi, with its computed digest from
the previous process, and hashes the result. Finally, it confirms
whether this computed digest equals H1 (root node hash).
As mentioned before, we are interested in MT’s correctness
and security. First, correctness implies that when P executes a
query Q over its own MT, then V gets the same outcome
as it would have if it had just computed Q locally. This
property opens the path to secret cooperation between agents
since encrypted verification data can be exchanged within
the swarm without disclosing any “raw” or “unprotected”
information. Second, security implies that a computationally
limited, deceiving P ′ cannot induce V to admit a faulty answer.
The basis of this property is the use of collision-resistant
hashes: if P ′ can cause V to accept an incorrect answer
then the proof returned by P ′ will yield a collision (i.e., two
different inputs produce the same output hash value). This
research assumes the hash generation method used (SHA3-
256) is collision-free, since the probability that different inputs
produce the same output is negligible. This property leads the
way to secure cooperation between agents.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Fig. 3 shows the initialization process of our experiments.
We assume that an external entity (e.g., the swarm’s operator)
designed and pre-computed a valid MT where all operations
to fulfill the swarm’s mission are included in the correct order
(1). Then, the resultant MT is broadcast to all the robots
(2) before the mission starts (3). During the mission, robots
can check whether the combined hash of potential actions
(ha) upon specific sensor’s inputs (hs) can be related to
their MT copy by trying to generate a valid proof. In this
work, we tackle the case in which m operations must be
Figure 2. (a) Merkle Tree (MT) implementation (d = 3) with 4 leafs, 2 interior, and 1 root nodes. Each leaf node (green) encapsulates the hash of two hashes:
a robot action (ha) and a robot sensor input (hs). Each leaf node represents one atomic operation robots should complete sequentially (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1) in
order to fulfill the swarm’s mission. Interior nodes encapsulate the hash of their two children, the same way that the root node encapsulates the hashes of its
two interior nodes. (b) Describes the path (in color) in order to get the proof for leaf node x1.
performed in a specific order (i.e., sequentially) and without
repetitions. As described in [38], our problem scenario can be
understood as a single operation (SO), single robot (SR), and
instantaneous Assignment (IA) scenario: SO-SR-IA. In SO,
robots are only able to execute one operation at a time. In
SR, operations requires exactly one robot to achieve them.
Finally, IA means that the available information concerning
the robots, the operations, and the environment permits only
an instantaneous allocation of operations to robots, with no
planning for future allocations. The mission is finished once
all operations are fulfilled in the right order and the MT is
therefore regarded as completed.
A. Foraging mission
We consider a robot foraging mission where a sequence
of colored tokens have to be delivered to a target location.
Each operation in this mission implies searching, retrieving,
and transporting one token to the center of the arena. After the
token is deposited in the target, robots can regard that operation
as completed and therefore exchange its corresponding MT
proof. The foraging mission is considered completed when at
least one robot (i.e., the carrier of the last token) completes its
entire MT. It is important to note that the order in which these
colored tokens have to be delivered is a priori unknown to the
robots, since they only count with the hash values included in
Figure 3. Experiment’s initialization process. (1) The swarm’s operator gen-
erates a valid MT where all the operations that fulfill the swarm’s mission
are included in the correct order. (2) The MT is broadcast to all robots in the
swarm. (3) The experiment starts.
the MT.
Fig. 4 is a snapshot of the simulation arena where the
foraging experiments were conducted. The environment
consists of a rectangular area (5×5 m2) with a central black
square (0.5×0.5 m2) representing the target location where
foot-bot robots [29] (Fig. 5(a)) need to transport the correct
sequence of discovered tokens. Fig. 5(b) depicts one of
the solid green cylinders that is used as a token within the
experiments. These tokens are 5 cm tall and 10 cm in diameter
and have a LED marker at the top that defines the token
color. Tokens of different colors represent different sensor
inputs. In this work, the color k of a token is chosen in the set
{green, red, blue, yellow,magenta, cyan,white, orange}.
A certain number Dk of tokens of each color k were randomly
positioned in the arena at the beginning of each simulation
run. All the experiments were conducted in ARGoS [39], a
modular multi-robot simulator and development environment.
Fig. 6 depicts the finite state machine (FSM) that controls
the robot for the foraging mission, which relies on three basic
behaviors:
Wander. The robot performs a random walk searching for
Figure 4. Simulation arena used in the foraging mission. The scenario consists
of a rectangular area of 5 × 5 m2 that provides adequate space for a small
swarm of robots within which robots, tokens, and a target location are placed.
Figure 5. (a) Diagram of the simulated foot-bot together with its sensors layout.
Foot-bot’s size and features correlate with real-world models for swarm and
multi-agent systems. (b) Token used in the experiments. Tokens simulate 3D
printed cylinders with the following dimensions: 5 cm tall and 10 cm in
diameter. The colored sphere at the top of the token represents an LED marker
to visually track and identify the tokens.
tokens. If the robot detects a token within its vision range
(Token.distance ≤ Vrange), it executes the Check be-
havior; otherwise it continues searching. During the execution
of this action the robot is able to detect obstacles such as walls
or other robots (within distance Orange) and avoid them.
Check. Once a token is within the robot’s vision range,
the robot can extract sensor information (point cloud data,
RFID data, etc.) from it. In this stage, robots perceive the
color of the LED marker associated with each of the tokens
as a sensor input. This information is used by the robots in
order to generate the sensor input hash (hs). For the considered
foraging task, the action hash ha encodes the “carry to target”
action. Robots executing the Check behavior combine hs and
ha to generate a meta-hash (Hxi = H(hs, ha)) that is used to
generate the proof pi. In case a proof pi exists for the current
working leaf node xi: ∃pi(xi,Hxi ), the combination of token
color and action (i.e., operation) can be verified as part of the
MT. Otherwise (∃!pi(xi,Hxi )), the robot returns to the Wander
behavior.
Handle. In case the robot generates a valid proof for the
visible token, the robot approaches the token until it reaches
a grabbing distance. In that moment, the robot activates its
Figure 6. Finite state machine for the robot behavior. Three behaviors—
Wander, Check, and Handle—are coded in every robot. Robots executing the
Wander behavior search the environment looking for tokens. Once a token is
found, robots execute the Check behavior. Then, robots extract the information
from the token (i.e., its color) and generate both hs and ha. Hxi is calculated
from rehashing hs and ha: Hxi = H(hs, ha). Hxi is verified against the
current working leaf node (xi) of the robot’s MT. In case it is possible to
generate a valid proof with the token’s information (∃pi(xi,Hxi )), the robot
executes the Handle behavior: this makes the robot grab the token and place
it in the target location (arena center). If not, the robot returns to the Wander
behavior. Robots stop executing the Handle behavior once the token is placed
in the target location or they receive the proof that xi was already completed.
gripper (Fig. 5(a)), grabs the token, and transports it to the
center of the arena. Once the robot reaches its destination
(Token.location = Target.location), the robot re-
leases the token and changes the status of the xi node as
completed in its local MT. Then, the robot increments the
pointer of the current working leaf node: xi = xi + 1 for
xi ∈ (0 ≥ xi ≥ n − 1). In case the robot receives a proof
that the xi has been already completed by another robot while
carrying the token, the robot drops the token and returns to
the Wander behavior.
Fig. 7, shows the robot interaction space. It is important to
note that during the execution of the three behaviors explained
previously, robots can exchange information with their peers
(e.g., xi, pi). If robots are within a Crange distance from other
robots, these can compare their MT copies by sending queries
(Q) about their correspondent working leaf nodes (xi) and
receive proofs (pi) in exchange as depicted in Fig. 1. By using
this method robots can update, synchronize, and complete their
own MT copies and therefore cooperate towards the fulfillment
of the swarm’s mission.
B. Maze formation mission
In the maze formation mission, instead of having the robots
modify the environment (e.g., transport tokens), we let them
become part of the environment.
Fig. 8(a) represents the “blueprint” of a 5× 5 maze where
0 represents an empty space, 1 a wall, and * and @ the
entrance and the exit of the maze, respectively. As illustrated
in Fig. 3, we generated (at design time) a complete MT where
leaf nodes encapsulate maze coordinates (instead of token
colors). According to their FSM controller (Fig. 6), robots start
exploring the arena executing the Wander behavior. Robots are
able to locate themselves (Fig. 7) in the 2D arena (5× 5 m2).
By knowing the cell dimensions (1× 1 m2) they can calculate
the (x,y) coordinates of the grid depicted in Fig. 8(a). Every
time a robot enters a new cell it executes the Check behavior.
Then, robots use the current grid (x,y) components to calculate
Figure 7. Robot communication and interaction diagram. Every robot con-
troller relies on three main thresholds: Orange represents the range where
obstacles are detected by robots in order to avoid collisions. Vrange represents
the robot’s maximum vision range to detect tokens. Crange represents the
minimum required distance for robots to communicate with one another.
the hs digest and the hash of the action “stop” as ha. In
case robots generate a valid proof pi, they execute the Handle
behavior, which leads them to find the center of the cell and
stop there (Fig. 8(b)). In the same way as in the foraging
mission, robots avoid already completed operations (in this
case stop in already occupied cells) by receiving the proof that
their current working leaf node (xi) was already completed. In
contrast to the foraging example, the maze formation mission
is finished once all operations have been completed as well as
all the robots have completed their MTs.
C. Analysis metrics
In order to evaluate and analyze the proposed approach we
rely on three metrics:
Performance. Performance measures how fast and reliably
a particular mission is carried out. In this paper, we use the
mission’s finishing time Ft to measure the amount of time
required to fulfill the swarm’s mission. In addition, we use
an estimate Ps of the probability that the system attains its
target objective in an amount of time τ [40]. Formally, let
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} be the index of an experiment, rj be the run
time of experiment j, and experiments that fulfill rj < TC
(Time Cap) be successful experiments. The estimate Ps of the
probability of success of the system over time (up to TC) is
defined as Ps(τ ≤ t) = {j|rj ≤ t}/k.
Communication cost. To measure communication costs,
we use the Communication Cost (CC) metric. CC represents
the number of times the P-V workflow (Fig. 1) takes place
during the mission multiplied by the size (in bytes) of the
proof (pi) the robots exchanged. When the MT is perfectly
balanced (n = 2d−1), the size of the proof pi is log2(n) + 2:
the number of hashes to reach the root node plus the hs, ha
hashes. In missions where all robots need to complete their
MTs — as for example in the maze formation mission — CC
can be accurately calculated with the following equation:
CC = Pn · Pl·|H| (1)
where Pn = ((Rn − 1) · n) is the total number of proofs
exchanged, Pl = log2(n) + 2 is the length of the proof, and
|H| is the size (in bytes) of the hash function used. The hash
Figure 8. (a) 5x5 matrix used in order to represent a maze. Four different
elements are included in the array: 0 (black) represents an empty space, 1
(red) represents a wall, * and @ (blue) represent the entrance and the exit
of the maze, respectively. (b) The maze depicted in (a) built by a swarm of
robots using the approach presented in this paper.
function used in this work (SHA3-256) has a hash size (|H|)
of 32 bytes.
Information diversity. In this research, robots are only
in contact with the raw sensor and action information from
the operations they carry out themselves. However, in swarm
robotics applications, it is difficult to fully ensure robots fulfill
only one operation per mission. Therefore, certain robot units
might be able to accumulate raw or unprotected information
that could be stolen if they are subject to attacks (e.g., physical
capture). To analyze this phenomenon, we introduce Shannon’s
equitability (Ie) to measure “evenness”, that is, to measure how
widely spread raw information is within the swarm.
Shannon’s equitability (Ie) can be calculated by dividing
Shannon’s index I by Imax:
Ie =
I
Imax
(2)
where Shannon’s index I = −∑Si=1 pi ln pi (i.e., Shannon’s
entropy [41]) is a mathematical measurement used to char-
acterize diversity (S is the total number of operations in the
mission and pi is the proportion of S made up of the ith
operation), and where Imax = lnS.
Ie assumes a value between 0 and 1, with 1 being com-
plete “evenness”: all robots carried out the same number of
operations and therefore were exposed to the same amount of
raw information.
IV. RESULTS
A set of 50 simulation experiments were carried out to
analyze the proposed approach in the foraging scenario shown
in Fig. 4. MTs with different n values were used in order to
increase the complexity and duration of the swarm’s foraging
mission. In addition, the following parameters were used:
Dk = 4, which implies that in simulations where the MT has
4 leaf nodes (n = 4), a total of 16 tokens are present in the
simulation arena. Experiments were run using Rn robots, Rn
∈ {1,. . . ,5}. The robot communication range (Crange) was
initialized to 2 m, the vision sensing distance (Vrange) was
fixed to 0.50 m, and finally the robot obstacle detection range
(Orange) was initialized to 0.10 m. The Time Cap (TC) for
each experiment was set to 10,000 seconds.
Figure 9. Average Ft (in secs) and standard deviations for different MT lengths
(n) and robot swarm sizes (Rn). Averaged results for the execution of an MT
with 4 (blue), 5 (ochre), 6 (green), 7 (red), and 8 (purple) leaf nodes.
Fig. 9 shows the finishing times (Ft) and standard de-
viations for several MT length configurations (n) and robot
swarm sizes (Rn). According to Fig. 9, the addition of more
Figure 10. Probability of success (Ps) for each one of the different config-
urations shown in Fig. 9. Empirical run-time distributions for the execution
of the foraging task with Rn = 1 (red), 2 (blue), 3 (green), 4 (black), and 5
(purple). For each one of these configurations solid (n = 4), dashed (n = 5),
dot-dashed (n = 6), dotted (n = 7), and asterisk-solid (n = 8) lines were
included.
robots decreases the Ft of the foraging mission regardless
of the length of the MT. However, these results suggest that
once a certain number of robots is present (Rn ≥ 3), the
length of the MT has a small impact on the Ft of the system.
Fig. 10 shows the progression of Ps for all the configurations
presented in Fig. 9. According to Fig. 10, the addition of more
robots increases Ps since lines become steeper and converge to
higher values sooner. However, these results also suggest that
as we increase n (the mission becomes longer), Ps converges
to lower values or reaches higher values later (especially for
Rn ≤ 3). It is important to note that Ps does not reach 1 (the
maximum value) in several configuration as experiments were
run up to TC and before convergence.
Figure 11. Communication Cost (CC) and information diversity (Ie) metrics
in blue and red colors, respectively, for different Rn and n values. Averaged
results and standard deviations suggest a direct relationship between the two
metrics in the foraging mission.
Fig. 11 shows averaged results and standard deviations for
the communication cost (CC) in KB and information diversity
measured by Shannon’s equitability index (Ie) for different
Rn (1 ≤ Rn ≤ 10) and n ∈ {2, 4, 8} configurations. Fig. 11
shows that CC increases linearly with Rn since there are more
robots exchanging information. Moreover, MTs with larger n
values also seem to increase the CC since the proofs robots
exchange are “heavier”. Larger standard deviation values, as
Rn increases, imply that there is no fixed number of P-
V workflows required to make one robot complete its MT
(finishing condition of the foraging mission). However, larger
Rn values tend to increase the information diversity (Ie) in
the swarm. This result suggests that, as we increase Rn, the
information in the swarm tends to become more diversified.
Fig. 11 also suggests that information diversity might have
an asymptotic behavior around 0.8 and a really large Rn
value might be necessary to converge to 1 (i.e., to complete
“evenness”).
Figure 12. Average Ft (in seconds) and standard deviations for the maze
formation mission with different robot swarm sizes. All results were obtained
with a maze of an MT with 16 (blue) leaf nodes (n = 16).
Figure 13. Communication cost (CC) and information diversity (Ie) metrics
in blue and red colors, respectively, for different Rn values for the maze
formation mission. Average results suggest no direct relationship between the
two metrics.
To complement the results introduced previously, an ad-
ditional set of 25 simulation experiments was carried out to
analyze the maze formation mission (Fig. 8). In this case,
n was fixed to 16 in order to match the number of cells
where the value 1 is present in Fig. 8(a). In addition, Rn
(n ≤ Rn ≤ 2n). Fig. 12 shows average Ft and standard
deviations for the maze formation mission. Fig. 12 shows the
same behavior as its foraging counterpart (Fig. 9): larger Rn
values reduce Ft. However, beyond a certain Rn value (Rn
≥ 20), no real impact on Ft can be seen. Complementarily,
Fig. 13 shows the CC and Ie metrics for the maze formation
mission. This figure also shows that CC increases linearly with
Rn. However, in contrast to Fig. 11, the absence of standard
deviations confirms that a fixed CC is required to make all
robots complete their MTs (finishing condition of the maze
formation mission). Finally, Fig. 13 depicts a scenario where
complete “evenness” of information (i.e., Ie = 1) is achieved.
This is possible since in the maze formation mission, when
robots find a cell where they can generate a valid pi proof, they
stop at its center, thereby, making robots capable of fulfilling
only one operation per mission, in contrast to the foraging
scenario, where one robot might be able to complete several
operations.
V. DISCUSSION
In this research, we show how two of the main MT prop-
erties (i.e., correctness and security) open a new path towards
secure and secret cooperation in robot swarms. Regarding
the security aspect, by using the proposed approach, robots
in a swarm are required to “prove” to their peers that they
fulfilled certain actions or that they know or “own” particular
information (i.e., proof-of-ownership [42]) to cooperate, rather
than merely rely on information received from other robots
(sensor data, votes, etc.). This approach makes robots resistant
against potential threats such as tampering attacks since any
alternation in the operation’s data (e.g., hs, ha) will necessarily
change the proof’s outcome. Regarding the secrecy component,
with the use of MTs swarm robots are now able to separate the
mission data from its verification. This allows robots to verify
that an operation was carried out by a member of the swarm
without knowing what this operation entailed or which robot
took part in its completion. This makes physical capture attacks
inefficient since individual robots might not have enough raw
or unprotected information to describe the high-level swarm’s
missions and goals, especially in large systems. However,
this doesn’t prevent swarm robots from cooperating to fulfill
complex missions since robots can still prove to their peers that
certain operations were discovered, carried out, and completed.
The proposed approach was tested in two different scenar-
ios: a foraging and a maze formation mission. In the foraging
case, results suggest that Rn maintains an inverse relationship
with Ft and a direct relationships with Ps. Therefore, increas-
ing the swarm size has a positive impact on the performance
of the system. However, results also show that CC grows
linearly as the swarm size (Rn) increases, which in extreme
situations (e.g., very large swarms) could represent a negative
effect on the system since individual robots might not be
able to cope with the bandwidth requirements. In contrast,
increasing Rn has the positive effect of increasing Ie since
we are increasing the probabilities of reaching more “even”
distributions of completed operations within the swarm. In the
maze formation mission, where Rn and n take larger values,
results also suggest that Rn maintains an inverse relationship
with Ft, Ie is maximized (i.e., Ie = 1), and even though
CC grows linearly, this still does not represent a challenging
situation for the swarm (e.g., 90 KB for a 32 robot system). It
is interesting to emphasize that due to these properties, swarm
robots can fulfill complex missions such as the maze formation
one without the means to infer high-level details such as where
the entrance or the exit might be located.
Encouraged by these results, we found appropriate to
analyze the feasibility of the proposed approach in complex
missions where the number of operations takes relatively large
values. Fig. 14 shows different LEGO R© models where a
sequential set of operations is required to achieve the final
outcome (i.e., build the replica). These models2 are good
projections of the missions presented in this work, especially
2Three of the replicas with the largest piece count according to the current
LEGO R© catalog: https://shop.lego.com/en-US/
Figure 14. Different LEGO R© models with their corresponding piece count.
LEGO R© models are a good example of complex sequential missions that
could be encapsulated in Merkle trees.
Fig. 14 Memory(KB)
CC/Rn
(MB)
ACT (s)
(a) Millennium Falcon
(7541 pieces) 235 KB 3.39 MB
G: 8.45 (4.86)
P: 0.0005 (1.54 e−5)
V: 0.0006 (2.10 e−5)
(b) Taj Mahal
(5923 pieces) 185 KB 2.54 MB
G: 6.62 (3.81)
P: 0.0005 (1.87 e−5)
V: 0.0006 (1.53 e−5)
(c) Bugatti Chiron
(3599 pieces) 112 KB 1.46 MB
G: 4.01 (2.30)
P: 0.0004 (1.58 e−5)
V: 0.0005 (1.71 e−5)
TABLE I. Memory, Communication Cost per robot (CC/Rn), and Average
Computation Time (ACT) requirements (with standard deviations in brackets)
for the models depicted in Fig. 14. All ACTs were obtained by using the
Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+ SBC.
since n takes a relatively large value. Due to the possibility
of accurately calculating the amount of CC required to make
all robots complete their MTs (Eq. 1) as well as the overall
size of the MT stored by robots, we can compute Fig. 14’s
corresponding MTs and measure their memory, communi-
cation cost per robot (CC/Rn) and Average Computation
Time (ACT) requirements. For the latter, we included the
following measures: generation of the complete Merkle tree
(G), generation of a proof (P), and verification of a proof (V).
Initial results for the aforementioned models are given in Table
I.
Table I shows that neither the memory, nor the commu-
nication cost per robot, nor the average computation time of
the corresponding MTs is out of reach of current commodity
hardware (e.g., Raspberry Pi 3 Model B+) and therefore it is
feasible for current robot platforms. It is important to note
that more than 99% of the computation time is taken by the
generation (G) of the MT that only takes place at the beginning
of the mission, while the proof assembly (P) and validation (V)
take an almost insignificant amount of time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Swarm robotics is starting to show potential in both aca-
demic and real-world scenarios. However, achieving secure
behaviors for large numbers of robots is still a challenging
problem. Recent studies have emphasized the importance and
lack of solutions for the security and privacy issues in the
distributed robotics field. Merkle trees are binary hash-tree
structures with two main properties: correctness and security.
These properties have the potential to achieve secure and
secret robot cooperation and therefore make robot swarms
resistant against tampered members and physical capture at-
tacks. By using Merkle trees, swarm operators can provide the
“blueprint” of the swarm’s objectives without disclosing raw
or unprotected data about the mission itself. The performance,
communication costs, and information diversity metrics of the
proposed combination were analyzed for two different sequen-
tial missions: foraging (where robots modify the environment)
and maze formation (where robots become the environment).
Results show that larger numbers of robots tend to increase the
performance of the system as well as diversify the amount of
information within the swarm. However, an increasing number
of robots as well as longer missions scale linearly together with
the communication requirements of the system. Nevertheless,
an initial analysis on the storage, communication costs, and
computational time for higher-scale missions reveals that the
use of Merkle trees for current robotic technology is within
reach.
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